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Abstract 
 
There have been almost 40 years after the restoration of democracy in Greece and a 
peculiar prosperity, which was consciously cultivated by the leaders of political and 
economic elites, was promoted before the onset of the financial crisis. However, from 
the beginning of the financial recession, the temporal illusions have been revealed and 
the need of a complete transformation of the financial policies has been expressed, 
while a significant transformation of the entire political culture has started. Parties 
such as SYRIZA, Independent Greeks(ANEL) and Golden Dawn took advantage of 
the growing social discontent by propagating themselves as exponents of ordinary 
people and of their concerns or their fears, as the expression of resistance against an 
avoidable sellout of public values. However, crisis has exposed a number of 
successive truths which were elaborately hiding in the underbelly of the detaining 
political and socioeconomic system. These truths were exteriorized once it became 
clear that the foundations on which the Greek society was based after the restoration 
of democracy, were weak and insufficient to lead country towards a modern future. 
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Introduction 
 
There is wide literature about the “political change” (μεταπολίτευση-metapolitefsi) in 
Greece after 1974 and the restoration of democracy, but a few are wondering about its 
main characteristics. Within a very condensed approach we try to define this political 
change as the transition from a long period of entrenched parliamentarism, which 
resulted in a brutal dictatorship, to a modern constitutional democracy. In other 
words, it is the obvious transition towardsa European system of guaranteed rights and 
freedoms and respectively, of a structured charter of obligations. Actually, it is the 
transition from “Balkan provincialism”to a modern but limited Europeanization. In 
philosophical terms,it can be assumed as the transition from regime’s obscurantism, 
from arbitrary insolence of power and uncontrolled state authoritarianism, to a free 
volutionary period. 
 
Besides the political freedom and the introduction of the concepts in“popular power” 
and the welfare state in politics, this political-regime change was associated with the 
rapid expansion of social prosperity and unbridled consumerism. Relatively, Kondylis 
(2015: 2-3) refers to the prevalence of a parasitic consumerism “indifferent to the 
long-term national implications, especially with regard to the country’s independence 
andnational decision autonomy”. Kondylis uses the term “parasitic consumerism” to 
characterize the weakness of Greece “to produce everything that it consumeswithout 
having sufficient restraint - and dignity - so as not to consume more than can produce 
and in order to consume, it parasitize in two directions: internally, bymortgaging the 
future resources, turning them into current repayments, and externally, byborrowing 
large amounts of money not for future –fruitful- investments, but in order to pay these 
vast quantities of consumed products, which were mainly imported” (Kondylis, 2015: 
3). This position,as reasonable as it may seem, it is actually simplistic as long as it 
ignores a whole range of material needs which had to be covered after the restoration 
of democracy. Among others, after the political change in Greece social inequality 
and poverty were drastically reduced as well as the overall welfare of the society was 
significantly increased (Mitrakos&Tsakloglou, 2012: 33-35; 40-43; 55).This 
development was necessary not only as a way to establish decent living conditions but 
also as a part of the convergence procedure with the rest of the European Union. 
Significantly, despite the huge reduction of inequality and poverty that occurred after 
the political change, Greece continues to encounter higher inequality and poverty 
levels, and lower social justice levels than most of the European Union countries 
(Mitrakos&Tsakloglou, 2012:56; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015). Moreover, the new 
regime marked rapid changes in the political field. In any case, the democratization of 
the country is related to the period of “change” from 19811 onwards in the sense the 
“change” of the 1980s which delivered a strong societal need: to overcome the 
hegemony which was established in the foundations of anti-communism domination. 
The negative effects of the “change” are well known; we tend to ignore though, the 
consequences of a possible “non-Change” (Prevelakis, 2016). 
 
The aim of this paper is to draw some basic arguments about the period after the 
restoration of democracy in Greece, the peculiarities and the ways the dominant 
parties have implemented policies under the influence of populism. The current 
coalition government is an explicit example of an “anti-political” party which 
basically aims at the gain and the preservation of governmental power through 
populism which finally seems not to benefit the public but only specific interests.  
 
 
The main achievements of the political change of 1974 
 
Fact is that the new regime as well as previous phases of the Greek political history, 
integrated and generated varying structural “Greek pathologies” which derive their 
origin from the Turkish occupation. Despite this, however, the social, political and 
economic achievements of this period contributed to the adjustment of the country to 
modern international and European standards after a long phase of obscurantism and 
authoritarianism. Even if someone can criticize the new regime, no one should deny 
the positive aspects.Such positive aspects of the new regime with which the country 
should be reconnected are a) the establishment of the National Health System, b) the 
introduction of labor and family law, c) the process of democratization of public 
institutions and of the army, d) the introduction of the transparent procedures for 
                                                 
 
hiring in the public sector (ASEP) and of Citizens’ ServiceCentres(KEP), e) the 
establishment of welfare institutions, f) the creation of modern infrastructure but with 
disproportionate costs, g) the computerization of the public services, h) a relatively 
fair redistribution of income and opportunities, i) regional convergence, andj) 
decentralization and investments in education and innovation. Allthe above mentioned 
crucial aspects should not be underestimated. 
 
In July 1974 thepublic rule was reinstated in Greece. As Cheliotis&Xenakis (2016: 
15) underlines “the new rightist interim government led by Constantine Karamanlis 
introduced a set of liberalisation measures, most notably the decriminalisation of 
communist parties that had been outlawed in the country since 1947. Other measures 
in this vein included the closure of the worst prison camps, the release of all 
remaining political prisoners, the pardoning of political crimes committed against the 
junta, therestoration of citizenship to all opponents of the dictatorship, and the 
removal of orders denying or limiting the right of individuals to travel abroad.The 
following governmental period of Andreas Papandreou and the left-wing PASOK 
government (1981-1989)“marks the point at which official efforts to confront the 
legacy of authoritarianism in the country not only targeted the attitudes, policies and 
practices embodied by the dictatorship of 1967– 1974 but were extended to address 
illiberalism over the post-Civil War era in its entirety. Just as, for example, pension 
rights were restored in 1985 to civil servants who had been dismissed during the junta 
for political reasons, so in 1989 criminal convictions were annulled for offences 
relating either to participation in the Civil War on the side of the Left or to leftist anti-
state activities between the end of the Civil War and the fall of the dictatorship in July 
1974” (Cheliotis&Xenakis, 2016: 18-19). 
 
Lyrintzis (2005: 242) also notes that the “Metapolitefsi” in Greece in its first phase is 
characterized by the effort of political parties to keep substantial political, structural 
and ideological distances from the pre-dictatorship party system, in order to introduce 
a substantive renewal of the political scene. At the social and economic level, the first 
democratic Government of the right–wing ND, under circumstances of political 
radicalism, has adopted an economic programme of “radical liberalism” which was an 
effort to combine economic stability and social cohesion, expanded the role of the 
state in economy, as it introduced nationalization of private companies and of the 
banking system (Lavdas, 2005: 308). On the other side, the PASOK Government of 
1981,asCrescenzi(2012: 151; 242-262) suggests,had introduced a classicalkeyensian 
economic policy with basic aims to increase the real wages of workers and 
pensioners, in order to decrease the economic and social inequalities, and to control 
the prices of the basic goods and public services. As Garcia &Karakatsanis (2006: 
130) notes, “with theaccession of power of Greece’s first socialist government, it was 
acknowledged that universal social service provision should be a governmental target. 
While the achievement of full socialcitizenship is still unrealised in Greece and,with 
the possible exception of health care provision throughout Southern Europe, we 
clearly indicate the importance firstly of democratization and secondly of partisan 
ideology in moving the Southern European welfare state to more universalistic 
models of welfare provision”. 
 
Concerning the European issue, PASOK did neglected his first anti-europeanpositions 
as it had supported the European perspective of the country and justified this choice 
with technocratic criteria, with argumentsthat presented the cost from exiting the 
EEC, as higher than the cost from staying as a full member.After the rise to power 
there was a clear distinction of PASOK’s political orientation towards the EEC. 
(Kazakos, 2010: 334-5).The political concept of Andreas Papandreou’s party focused 
on the achievement ofadvantages for the Greek economy through partial hard 
negotiations on the terms of the Greek agreement to enter the EEC (Tassis, 2015: 44).  
 
 
Some irrefutable truths  
 
Despite the numerous democratic and social reforms introduced in the “Metapolitefsi” 
(regime change) period,from 1974 until 2010, it turns out that the current economic 
crisis has totally reversed the political landscape as a consequence of the existed 
discrepancies. Specifically, the political and party system was totally eclipsed with the 
legitimate category that for a long period it had cultivated a cliental state with high 
corruption levels instead ofpreparing the countryfor theEuropeanisation process. 
Indeed, crisis has exposed a number of successive truths which were elaborately 
hiding in the underbelly of the detaining political and socioeconomic system 
(Mavrozacharakis, 2015). Thesetruthswere externalized once it became clear that the 
foundations of the new regime on which the Greek society was formed,were weak and 
not sufficient to guide the country’s process towards a modern future. 
 
The first obvious truth that is not assimilated by the existing political system, is that 
an economy with weak productive base and hence with foreign trade deficit, produces 
continuous financial problems instead of creating sufficient job vacancies. The second 
truth is that the Greek political system is being reproduced for itself and not with the 
civil society. It is therefore a self-reporting system with embedded entropy 
mechanisms, i.e. self-destructive mechanisms.The third truth is that the state 
shouldnot become a key employer in the context of a capitalist economy, let alone if it 
is not supplied with the required performance conditions as well as egalitarianism and 
fairness. Ultimately,asLavdas (2013) aptly indicates,there is a fundamental deficit 
ofmodern Greek pragmatism,which actuallycomprise a significant obstacle to any 
rational attempt to recast the Greek state. 
 
The “anti-political stateness” 
 
The political forces, instead of trying to resolve the abovementioned urgent problems 
and peculiarities thatdeplore Greece, avoided to be placed in the axis of the real truths 
and remained exclusively locked under the dilemma “memorandum versus anti-
memorandum”. Unfortunately, the enlightened, progressive and democratic forces in 
Greece have failed to reunite the country with those productive aspects of the new 
regime which is stagnant,as a result of clientelism and fruitless “anti-
political”stateness. The antipoliticalstateness is related to what Amir Abedi 
(2004)indicates as “anti-political Establishments Parties”, whichfulfil the following 
criteria(2004: 11): 
 
•A party that challenges the status quo in terms of major policy and political system 
issues, 
•A party that perceives itself as a challenger to the parties that comprise the political 
establishment, 
•A party that asserts that there is a fundamental divide between the political 
establishment and the people. It thereby implies that all parties either in government 
or in opposition are essentially the same. 
 
The anti-political stateness is interwoven with the specific character of the modern 
Greek state which does not manage to promote the collective interest, but enhances 
self-interest patrons, trade unions’ interests and cliental relations. The Greek state 
after 1974 is used by multifaceted cartel parties, naturally as themain toolfor electoral 
victory. Even political parties such as PASOK, which in its origin had the 
characteristics of a mass party that according toAbedi (2004: 89-90) is distinguished 
by a broad and socially cohesive organized membership base, specific internal party 
processes and a statute authorities map, have totally been changed. Such parties 
hadthe character ofa movement with successful demands on social and political rights 
andfinally, were characterized by an intense process of transformation and alienation 
of their original character to take the form of an inclusive party and lately a cartel 
party. The inclusive party is now characterized by heterogeneity of its 
electoralbasewith electoral successbecoming its main objective. Unlike mass 
parties,which focus on a socially homogeneous audience, the inclusiveones appeal to 
a diverse electorate on the basis of modern communicative methods. Currently, the 
ideological differentiation passes into the background.Greek political parties formed 
patronage networks in the whole spectrum of society and did not function as 
intermediary civil society restraints but as mediatorsof specific interests and 
expectations of their clientele, transferring and representing segmented and specific 
requests within society (Ferrera, 2010). To the extent that vested political parties 
functioned more as mechanisms of state clientele representation, they gradually lost 
their organized basis and their number of active members has rapidly 
decreased(Matsaganis, 2011). 
 
The abovementioned situation led these parties to a complete focus on the state as a 
supplier of the necessary resources. As Abediindicates (2004: 90), the need for 
resources and the deficit of large ideological and political conflicts turned the survival 
objective into the sole aim of incumbent parties. This common objective boosted the 
creation of a cartel which supplied its members with the necessary means for survival, 
while ensure that potential risks are limited. The invasion of incumbent parties in state 
power and the imposition of their survival over institutions’function,not only secured 
the necessary resources, which vested parties perpetuated their survival, but also 
enhanced the ability of incumbent parties to resist facing challenges posed by 
emerging radical political formations of the left and the right of the political spectrum. 
Under these conditions, as stated by Katz and Mair (1992: 16), the statewas 
transformed into an institutionalized structure that supports only the“networked” and 
the“insiders” and excludes those who have not crept into the inner of such network 
(outsiders)(Ferrera, 1996; 2010; Moreno, 2000; Perez-Diaz and Rodriguez, 1994). In 
other words, these parties lost their mediatory function with civil society and were 
digested by the state. 
 
Especially in countries with great tradition in cliental distribution of privileges, such 
as Greece, cartel parties have found lucrative ground. Theonset of the economic crisis 
decreased significantly thepublic funds, which had catalytic role for the enhancement 
of the traditional cartel parties and consequently, their position in power was 
challenged by a new inclusivecoalition which was formed under the aegis of the left 
SYRIZA. 
 
Therefore, the total presence of political parties can be regarded as “anti-political” as 
long as there is aproblematic relationship with the collective well-being and the public 
interest. This means that the political parties in Greece did notservethe“common”, in 
the Aristotelian sense, namely the policy for the benefit of the society. At the core of 
party actions was the aim of the reproduction in power through the state rather than 
the public interest that determines the general concept of policy. For Aristotle, the 
coordinated society can be achieved through policy that promotes the common good. 
In this sense, the policy reduces individual harnesses and fragmented interests that 
endanger the social body and aims to maintain state normality and continuity 
(Brunkhorst, 1992). In modern societies the proper state is not possible to be 
established through a homogeneous community of virtue, as Aristotle introduced it, 
but through a community of law (rule of law) among unknown citizens. Political 
justice is achieved through the separation of those elements which are positive for 
everyone under eternal conditions and those that are positive for a specific group of 
people at a particular juncture. In other words, in modern democracies, justice and its 
promotion through respective institutions and relationships that are based on it, under 
conditions of autonomy of a conscious person, override the subjective and 
individualized parameters (Rawls, 1993). 
 
Regarding the subjective dimension in Greece, it turns out that the concept of rational 
citizen who promotes the cooperation with fellow citizens under commonly accepted 
conditions, has never been cultivated. According to Rawls, rational citizens are 
“willing to propose and abide by mutually agreed rules, provided that others will do 
the same; and will respect these rules even if this means that they have to sacrifice 
their personal interests. Rational citizens want to belong to a society where political 
power is legally used”(Wenar, 2010). However,in Greece the political system 
suppressed the real political, economic and financial imperatives, which, even in 
latent form,became an existential danger to the country. Generally, the state in Greece 
historically embodies only superficially the concept of financial rationality and the 
balance of public expenditure and revenues, while rule parties represented 
emphatically the essence of offering more benefits, - rather unequally and not based 
on needs assessment - in order to obtain citizens’trust(Ferrera, 2010; Matsaganis, 
2011). 
 
In conclusion, these 40 years after the restoration of democracy in Greece, citizens 
lived in a sham prosperity founded on imaginary obsessions, consciously cultivated 
by the leaders of political and economic elite. However, since the beginning of the 
financial crisis, the temporal illusions and the need to change the whole political and 
economic system, became the main priorities which enabled enormous changes of the 
established political culture.In the beginning of the crisis the social democratic 
PASOK lifted the burden of fiscal adjustment. In 2010 PASOK took over the 
responsibility to implement austerity measures through memoranda of understanding 
with the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International 
Monetary Fund, in order to avoid the bankruptcy of Greece. With the subsequent 
electoral collapse of PASOK, the right-wing New Democracy - along with PASOK - 
continued from 2012 the implementation of austerity measures, which led to their 
electoral defeat in 2015. Parties such as SYRIZA, Independent Greeks (ANEL) and 
Golden Dawn took advantage of the growing social discontent propaganda to 
becomethe main exponents of ordinary people and of their concerns and fears, by 
expressing the resistance against avoidable oversell of popular values.  
  
The replacement of“anti-political” parties by an“anti-political” populism  
           
Specifically, SYRIZA emerged to power through a combination of circumstances 
which abruptly and without intermediary interval adjustingperiod, entrapped Greece 
in a sovereign debt crisis. The origins of the crisis are in policies that previous 
governments implemented,which were arbitrarily addicted to irrational redistribution 
without the establishment of a vigorous welfare state with efficient services and 
significant results in social inequality reduction throughthe promotion of social 
cohesion. Therefore, theeconomic crisis management, which is a tough and 
demanding task,changed the founding values of several political groups in Greece.
  
 
Definitively, the rise to power of SYRIZA overturned the conditions which were used 
in order to maintain the traditional bourgeois parties in power. From 2008 
onwards,the sudden elimination of those terms and conditions which reproduced the 
established cliental consent after the restoration of democracy in Greece, amid broad 
distribution of benefit and privileges, gradually led to a populist radicalization of the 
masses under the auspices of the left SYRIZA (Mavrozacharakis, 
Tzagkarakis,Kamekis, 2013). The main keynote address of SYRIZA, which was the 
world “hope”,can be characterized as“anti-political” in the sense that it was based on 
the versatility and on a high degree of ideological ambiguity. Therefore,there were no 
direct real class placements and external commitments. This fact is obviously contrary 
to the “left political verbosity” of SYRIZA which considers the “Greek people” as a 
single collective alliance against specific financial policies and international 
obligations of Greece. With anti-political way, namely by a methodology which is 
deeply contrary to the public good, SYRIZA cultivated to Greek people a deep feeling 
of aversion towards political elites, the European Union, the German government and 
the employers in general.  
 
In the midst of the economic crisis, populism and its respective multipliers 
increaseddramatically. The pressure of unemployment, the new poverty, rage against 
politicians and the fear forsocial and economic collapse, offered more than ever, 
lucrative ground for a policy that worked with simplistic slogans fueling aggressive 
feelings, prejudices and resentments. However, over time, in the case of the SYRIZA, 
leftist self-determination was reversed into a peculiar mixture of “right, capitulated or 
even neoliberal left”, which reveals a huge gap between promises and implementation 
(Munchau, 2015; Kotroyannos, 2016).  
 
On the one hand, the rise of the left in power was a result of thestructural problems 
and economic weaknesses of the Greek state and the inability of the previous 
governments to promote the necessary reforms in order to establish a modern rule of 
law and an effective state with universal, efficient welfare state and fiscal tolerated 
social services. On the other hand, the imposed austerity programs from the European 
institutions and the International Monetary Fund (troika) are also responsibleas long 
as they did not let fiscal space for the promotion of social cohesion.The current 
contrast between financial authoritarianism and social achievements preservation 
comprises the continuation of a dangerous approach which considers the citizen 
mainly as a “customer”. Therefore,in this conflict there are neither visible boundaries 
nor clear dividing lines since the implemented austerity policies are defended both by 
right-wing and left/center-left-wing parties.  
 
SYRIZA, instead of analyzing the current situation with caution and realism, in order 
to propose long-term responses to the difficult circumstances, was either trapped in 
the search for ways ofthe new memorandum management or was assimilated by a 
fruitless intolerant logic. Apparently, this happened because the political tradition 
expressed by the new government of the left, is derived equally from the past 
activities and does not represent anything really “new”. Therefore, thefirst dangerous 
and sensational alternative responses to the crisis, were followed by the usual manner 
of maintaining the power even by implementing anti-social and unrealistic measures, 
such as massive tax increases.  
 
Basic directions of a progressive response to the crisis 
 
After 1974, Greece has entered in a period ofpolitical stability, establishment of rule 
of law and economic progress(Sotiropoulos, 2014). At the same time, Greece has 
started implementingits European integration process, because it was realized,by the 
main internal political actors and by the main international allies of the country, that 
the smooth functioning of the parliamentary system, institutional modernization, 
economic growth as well as the country’s defensive fortification and positioning in 
the international system would be beneficial if served with Greece becoming a full 
member of the EEC (Sotiropoulos, 2014).            
 
Ιn this sense,  those arguments pertaining exclusively the period of the political 
change in Greece after 1974, as the only cause for the current social and 
economicdiscrepanciesare one-sided and misleading. This kind of argumentation 
attaches to the post-junta period the current problems of the Greek economy and thus, 
of the current crisis. The basic argument is that the large public sector and the 
hindering of the private sector led the Greek economy to bankruptcy (Skaperdas, 
2011). In other words,according to some scholars such as Alogoskoufis (2012), the 
roots of today’s bankruptcy are related to policies that prevailed during the 
dictatorship and implemented the first decade after the restoration of democracy. 
Especially the period of the PASOK in government (1981-1989), is associated with a 
rapid shift in the policy mix and an increase of public deficits and debt. Public deficit 
was raised due to the increase of social benefits from the Andreas Papandreou 
government and efforts to support the weak parts of the Greek capital (e.g. support 
firms in economic difficulties) (Pappas, 2010). But at the same time, tax revenues 
remain almost constant, thereby increasing the public debt from 30% in 1981 to 80% 
of GDP in 1989 (Matziorinis, 1993). Definitely, the increase in social spending 
enlarges the “state”, but from the period of the political change until today thelevel is 
lower than the average of European countries (Matsaganis, 2013: 17). Currently, the 
most rapid decline which was recorded for Greece, was the social spending – to –
GDP ratio which fell by almost 2 percentage points since its peak in 2012 (OECD, 
2014: 2). Considering the indicator which correlates public spending to GDP, this 
ratio, was about 46% during the 1980s and was less stable than the average of the 
EEC countries, which at that time was 49.5%. This trend continued in subsequent 
years, although the predominance of austerity policies reduced the ratio to 48% in the 
EU (Vaughan-Whitehead, 2014).    
 
Furthermore, during the period after the restoration of democracy in Greece, the 
expenditure on salaries of civil servants / GDP, does not exceed 11%, when in Europe 
itfluctuates between 11 and 12%, showing that theories for redundant civil servants 
with overpaid is stale. Finally, an element that should be considered, is that the 
expenditure on militarysupplies / GDP in the period 1974-1989 in Greece is 2.3% 
higher than the European average, which considered over a period of 16 years, it is 
actually translated into a burden of public debt for almost 40 % (Chrysogelos, 2010). 
That means, if the country spends the same proportion as the other European countries 
for its defense, the public debt in 1990 instead of 80% of GDP would have been about 
40%!     
        
However, the main reason for the increase of the debt must be inquired in the revenue 
gap. If there is a common point in fiscal policy from the dictatorship until 2009, it is 
the overall low level of taxes and particularly the increased tax evasion of affluent 
income groups and companies. Currently the tax evasion in Greece amounts from 
12% to 15% of annual economic output. This means 40 to 45 billion Euros a year. If 
tax authorities could even catch the half of tax evasion, the Greek economic problem 
of the public sector would have been solved (Merten, 2012: 26). Therefore,there is a 
sense of truth in the argument that Andreas Papandreou’s policies, “promoted a 
program of imprudent economic expansion based on the manipulation of the state and 
its resources without creating a stable tax basis able to fund such a policy” (Pappas, 
2010). Nevertheless, the other claim that the period of Andreas Papandreou’s 
government is “backing  a large and expansive, albeit not necessarily strong, state that  
geared towards patronage politics that promotes not collective national welfare, but  
provide jobs and social benefits to selected individuals, mostly PASOK’s supporters” 
(Pappas, 2010), is only relatively true. Although public sector was increased 
considerably, its services also expended but in a peculiar way and not under needs 
assessment procedures. Unnecessary increase of the personnel in the public sector was 
often the result of the pressure by interest groups and this historical structural deficit 
of the Greek state reveal “bureaucratic inertia, lack of policy innovation, clientelist 
commitments, and legislative deadlocks have largely prevented the crisis from 
becoming also a window of opportunity” (Lavdas, 2015: 3).   
     
Especially, the left wing SYRIZA has emerged to power through a combination of 
circumstances which suddenly and without mediating adaptation period, caged Greece 
in a sovereign debt crisis. A significant reason for the emergence of this crisis, was 
the irresponsible and irrational mix of policies that major parties implemented after 
the restoration of democracy which created a large but ineffective public sector that 
was not capable to resolve social problems and provide social cohesion. The coalition 
government between SYRIZA and ANEL behaves regularly as an “opposition front” 
that grows out through a strong denunciation of the implemented policies of the past. 
Currently, the challenge of economic crisis management affected the values of almost 
all the political areas in Greece. With the rise of SYRIZA in power the conditions 
which maintained the traditional bourgeois parties in power were finally overturned. 
From 2008 onwards, the sudden elimination of those terms and conditions which 
reproduced the established cliental consensus of modern democracy in Greece, amid a 
broad distribution of benefits, privileges and powers, gradually led to a populist 
radicalization of the masses under the auspices of the left SYRIZA, which also 
expanded populism as this is one of the basic features of an “anti-political” party. This 
is the exact continuation of the populism tradition in Greek politics, which has 
generated the majority of the factors which contributed to the current 
multidimensional crisis. 
 
Generally, contemporary populism in Greece transformed a part of the society to an 
irrational mass which lacks orientation, while awakened expectations that are not 
feasible in budgetary terms. This happened because the populist parties in Greece 
targeted their propaganda during economic crisis to those sections of the population 
who have lost much of their prosperity and social security by the crisis. Under these 
circumstances, a primitive nationalism was unfolded and many Greeks adopted an 
illusion of resistance against a nonexistent occupier. A parallel result of this kind of 
nationalism was the intensification of hostility against Europe. Greece came close to 
the collapse of its European identity and SYRIZA had a great responsibility as long 
as, at a time of social contradictions sharpening, it cultivated with semblance a social 
narcissism under its populist strategy.       
 
The party of the left took advantage of the social divisions and conflicts that emerged 
during the crisis and tried to attract both social groups with high education and 
training index that were marginalized and those with less education and training. 
Though conflicting groups were put both under the umbrella of SYRIZA in an 
attempt to construct a new political situation, the left never answered the central 
question of an alternative strategy if the renegotiation of austerity fails. Under these 
circumstances, the active political-ideological turn (U-TURN) of the ruling party was 
inevitable and as a result, it signed the agreement for the implementation of a third 
Memorandum. This was a total defeat of the leftist ideologies on “debt relief”, “debt 
colony” and the cancellation and renegotiation of the Memorandum. In other words, 
the left in Greece won the elections but it was ideologically defeated. This is the price 
for its establishment in power with a populist and unrealistic propaganda.    
 
Conclusion 
 
It is clear that Greece needs a new productive system and in this context, a new 
political system, which produces goods and ideas that will be connected with a 
strategic framework,which increase employment and generally the social conditions. 
A meaningful progressive response to the crisis is not unilateral and obsessive, it 
should promote the necessary reforms but always maintain a certain level of social 
cohesion and not dissolve social cohesion to supposedly increase competitiveness. A 
progressive response to the crisis should not hesitate but put the core European 
countries and particularly Germany, in front of their responsibilities.It should not be 
underestimated that Germany had offered to South European countries, for a specific 
time,extended loans and had promoted lending with attractive rates and favorable 
repayment terms. In fact, Germany has created inflation to other countries while it 
kept its own inflation in low levels through low wages. This fact, combined with the 
enormous public and private spending on innovation, was actually its competitive 
advantage. In that period in Greece the real challenge was the promotion of 
modernization and reforms. Twenty years later,the challenge has not even slightly 
changed and is high time to implement the necessary changes without neoliberal or 
leftist obsessions. 
 
If there is no real democratic and social shift in Greece, the group of voters who 
prefer electoral populism and especially the extreme right, will enormously increase. 
Moreover, these voters are at least“losers, unfinished consumers” (Bauman, 2010). 
This means that they do not prefer the abolition of the current society and the 
establishment of another but eventually claim to participate in it as full consumers, i.e. 
citizens of a capitalist consumerist society. 
 Based on Bauman’s argument (2009), it turns out that people in post-modern 
societiesare only considered useful if they operate as integrated consumers. 
Consumption is actually the individual’s contribution to a market economy. An 
“unfinished consumer” has entrenched social status and is considered useless because 
his position is utterly hopeless. Modern societies reactcynically topoor people, who 
are unable to function as active consumers, converging in some way to a tendency for 
their disappearance from their apparent bourgeois façade. It is no coincidence that the 
poor are expelled from the west urban centers. This trend explains why the modern 
welfare state is unable to protect the unemployed and especially the long-term 
unemployed, considering that these people are no longer useful and only affect the 
taxpayers. The political consensus around the core features of the welfare state that 
takes care of the vulnerable and needy,graduallybecomes finite. Only nostalgia 
remains alive. But nostalgia generates protest and centrifugal tendencies. 
 
The active solidaristproletariat has become a social layer of permanent precarity (the 
precariat), which supports dubious political directions (Standing, 2011). This shift is 
logically inevitable in the sense that the existing political forces that manage the 
power are possessed by the same fiscal obsession. According to Bauman (2009; 
2010), the reduction of social spending is an objective of both the right and the 
(center) left policy. Regardless of the party which is in power,the objective is the 
same just because they believe that according to the conventional economy they do 
not comprise financial advantages. In conjunction with the political behavior of 
impoverished social groups, populism is supported by relegation fears which occupy 
an increasing part of the middle socio-economic groups within the thorough process 
of modernization and globalization. A progressive reaction to these problems should 
consider all the above mentioned and implement a policy which will be concentrated 
both at financial stability and social cohesion promotion while not repeating the same 
catastrophic “anti-political” - populist practices have diminished the prospects for 
sustainable societal development. 
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